Category Archives: Support Weapons

Cartel Grenades Explode Back into the News

Reanimated M67 training or dummy grenades recovered in Mexico.

Reanimated M67 training or dummy grenades recovered in Mexico.

From the equivalent of the “Early Bird” sent to Federal LEOs earlier this week:

MEXICAN CARTELS USING GRENADES. The International Business Times (UK) (8/18, 173K) reports that ICE officials have observed a “trend increase” in the use of grenades by Mexican drug cartels in recent months. James Phelps, an assistant professor in the Department of Security Studies and Criminal Justice at Angelo State University in Texas, is quoted saying, “The reason you’re seeing so many more [grenades] this year is because much more heavily-armed drug shipments are coming into the United States…With Border Patrol so heavily distracted doing paperwork and watching the mass flood of people coming into the country, they don’t have as much time to do what they used to do — drug interdiction.”

But wait: It’s Not News

The IBT article is here (it was linked in the original, too) but what struck us is not what’s new about this, but what isn’t. Customs and Border Patrol has been seizing grenades on the border for a long time. ATF has been tracking this since the nineties, and has been on it hot and heavy since the early oughts. We have access to a long-ago-leaked 2011 LES presentation on Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) use of both surplus and improvised grenades.


One interesting thing is that not all cartels have good sources of military grenades, hence the back-up of improv ‘nades.

Slide 1

Reports indicate that Los Zetas historically try to seek grenades from sources in Guatemala, due to their control of many areas in that country. The Gulf Cartel has historically attempted to acquire their grenades from Mexican military sources, whereas the Sinaloa Cartel has sought to acquire improvised grenades.

Sinaloa was supported to that end by the ATF’s gunwalking program, which included walking grenade components, as a sideline to the main project of walking guns. The military grenades that the cartels are swapping off tend to be leftovers from 80s and 90s unrest and insurgencies in Central America, plus the Mexican military’s ongoing loyalty problems. The ATF alleges that, “90% of grenades traced in Mexico are over 20 years old.”

grenades_seized_2010But grenades walked by ATF’s cats-paw Jean Baptiste Kingery were used in 2013, along with other weapons which may or may not have been ATF-walked, to murder three officers of the Jalisco State Police in the village of Tepatitlan.  According to an ATF Significant Incident Report by liaison officer Jonathan Ortiz in the Bureau’s Mexico City office, one of ten grenades was attributed positively to Kingery by the Mexican officers, based on unspecified “evidence,” with no information on the other nine available.  Here’s the SIR:

ATF SIR Kingery Grenade 20131010.pdf

Within days of the SIR’s transmission, CBS had a story about it by then-CBS reporter Sharyl Attkisson (caution, autoplay video). It was kept off the evening news, but appeared on a morning show.

More grenades. In this case a mixed bag of reanimated M26 and M67, plus some GI M67s and 40mm rounds.

More grenades, seized by Mexican cops. In this case a mixed bag of reanimated M26 and M67, plus some GI M67s and 40mm rounds.

The history of the Kingery grenades is instructive. Kingery sourced his parts in the USA, then brought them to Mexico for final assembly and delivery. He was under ATF observation (although they thought he was under their control, a very different thing), from 2004 to 2010, when he made aliyah to his Sinaloa pals. He remains in Mexico; he was arrested there but ATF and DOJ has been remarkably uninterested in extraditing him.

The grenades, like the Iron River of ATF-sourced guns, were delivered to the cartels and to Mexico with the approval of Phoenix Group VII (SA’s Voth and McAllister inter alia), and the local US Attorney and an Assistant (Dennis K. Burke and Emory Hurley). The grenade-walking was also blessed by every layer of ATF and DOJ supervision. This included the Phoenix SACs and all management levels up to then-director Kenneth Melson and AG Eric Holder. Particularly responsible, apart from Voth and McAllister, were Phoenix field division SAC Bill Newell and Current Director Byron Todd Jones participated in the planning of the gun- and grenade-walking from his position in faraway Minnesota, as a trusted intimate of Holder.

The objective of the grenade-walking seems to have been to support the gunwalking; the intent of the gunwalking was to produce a series of crimes in Mexico that would justify new anti-gun laws and new powers for the ATF in the USA. The Mexican Government maintained plausible deniability on the operation. Several ATF agents pointed out the likely result: cops being killed in the USA and in Mexico, but those named managers were indifferent to the deaths; after Border Patrol officer Brian Terry was murdered by an ATF-furnished weapon, and first dozens, then scores, then hundreds, of Mexican lawmen were slain, David Voth was “giddy” over the bloodshed.

One wonders if Voth is still giddy, as more and more Mexican law officers keep getting deadened by his work product. (Like most gunwalking figures, except for Melson and Burke, Voth was promoted to HQ after the scandal broke).

How Do the Bad Guys Reload Grenades?

They start with training grenades. These grenades resemble the real thing, but produce a loud bang and a puff of smoke and zero fragmentation.  Because they have a fuze optimized to do that, no frag material (usually), and no filling. The grenades are reusable for training by simply discarding the old fuze and introducing a new one. To prevent too-easy conversion, and give the report of the fuze someplace to go, the training ‘nades have holes in them where the factory grenade has a thick welded-on or cast-in base plug. Training grenades also lack the internal fragmentation liner of most newer grenades (on the old Mk II “pineapple” grenade, fragmentation was supposed to be promoted by the scored lines, and the training grenade is similar to the frag, except for the extra bottom hole).

improvised_cartel_grenadesA normal defensive grenade like the M67, standard from the end of Vietnam on, has fragmentation material (often in a sleeve or liner) and a filling of high explosive (for an M67, Composition B). It has a fuze that contains a percussion cap and hammer mechanism to start the fuze train going, a delay element, and then a cap, gaine or booster which detonates with enough force to produce detonation in the relatively stable explosive filler.

The cartel-improvised grenades always lack the frag sleeve, and usually substitute black powder (or another easily manufactured low-explosive improvised filling) for the HE. (Technically, the difference between LE and HE is the velocity of the detonation front: in HE it is supersonic). As a result, they’re less effective than factory grenades, and are more like offensive grenades than defensive ones. A further result is that factory grenades are preferred to improvised grenades by most cartel sicarios. 

The following picture is from al-Reuters and was one of the illustrations used by the International Business Times in the story picked up by the DHS-DOJ Early Bird. Note that along with a Smith .357 and a Tec-9, this particular cartelitito, bagged in 2012, had nine M67s, three M26s, and eight Mk IIs. Oh, and an M72A2 LAW. These weapons appear to be almost all factory, not improvised (note the safety clips on the spoons of the M67s, something rarely seen on improvised ‘nades).

weapons-seized-zetas-cartel-reutersJust to remind everybody: Mexican law enforcement thinks this kind of thing is caused by the 2nd Amendment, and if we had the strict gun bans that they have, we’d live in a paradise, like they do.

Why Is It In The News Now?

If the cartels’ ‘nades are an old story, why are they in today’s news? For instance, in:

We don’t know for sure, but this sudden reanimation of an undead necrostory from years ago suggests that its battlefield prep by regulators, the administration, and their junior varsity in the media. It suggests an anti-dummy-grenade legislative or, more likely, regulatory initiative is in the works.

The ATF has eased its focus on gunwalking, but it’s never given up its desire for more authority. So you’ll see a spate of stories like those linked above, then editorial calls to unthinking action: Act Now! For the Children! They will certainly never admit that these criminals have these weapons (all, you will note, US military issue weapons) because the US furnished weapons to nations and insurgents with rotten inventory control, and definitely don’t want to mention ATF’s role in gunning up los sicarios. They are unlikely to give up their underpants-gnome theory of criminal organization takedowns, but are still stuck on the bit where the enhanced criminal organization commits more crimes.

The “Proximity Fuzed” RPG that wasn’t

In Russia, the improved RPG-7 replaced the RPG-2 in 1961, but it took years for the improved antitank weapons to filter to the Soviet Union’s client states and it took even longer to get to Soviet-supported terrorists and insurgents, even the ones that the USSR recognized militarily, like North Vietnam. When the new AT weapon emerged, it was immediately a threat to American and Republic of Vietnam aircraft, especially low- and slow-flying helicopters.

Here’s the story of a Air Force special operations helicopter gunship pilot’s nerve-wracking experience, while covering a South Vietnamese Air Force recovery of a Vietnamese reconnaissance team. The RT came from TF3AE, the command that replaced Command and Control South in Vietnam. We draw the story from Fred Lindsey’s fantastic doorstop, Secret Green Beret Commandos in Cambodia. (We’ve mentioned the book before). You can find it on page 670-671, and it’s worth reading for the adventure of it, before we start discussing dry RPG facts.

03/26/71 Recon, TF3AE ARVN RT Rescued With Air Support by 219″ VNAF Kingbees and
20th SOS Gunships: AC CPT Charles D. Svoboda DFC (2OLC) with co-pilot LTC Harmon
Brotnov; AC CPT Jim Schuman SS.
The only details of this event are from the remembrance of CPT Svoboda’s and [his] DFC citation. In his written recollection he notes:

It was on my first week on the mission as an aircraft commander. My copilot was my brand new squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel Brotnov, who was on the mission for the first time, and my gunners were this new “student” gunner and a highly experienced instructor gunner. Jim Schuman was flying lead, and I was flying on his wing. We were called out for
a team taking extremely heavy fire. We arrived at the location, and were briefed by the FAC on where the team was (we certainly don’t want to hit our own troops). We saw a very unfriendly situation, with a rather large landing zone, with the team on the south, and Charlie on the north. Unfortunately. Charlie was ensconced on a long, low ridge, overlooking the LZ and the team. We hated going below the enemy, as we could not fire upward through our own rotor blades. If we flew high, we were sitting ducks. If we flew low, with Charlie on a ridge, above us, we could only make short bursts of gunfire in his direction by banking the aircraft in the opposite direction, and raising the rotors above the path of our own minigun bullets.

Jim (Gunship lead) directed that we make an ‘aggressive’ entry, meaning that we would dive toward the LZ, and toward the enemy, firing rockets and miniguns at maximum rate of speed (4.000 rounds per minute). Jim was checking out a new pilot, allowing him to fly, and the new pilot lost the target, forcing his bird to cease-fire. He told me of this, and I told him that I still had the target, and would assume flight lead, so that he could then roll in on my rockets and become my wingman.

We made an aggressive dive, after which the FAC radioed “Cease Fire, you’re hitting the team.” We always feared this! Guns firing 4,000 rounds per minute each, along with rockets, can tear up a group of soldiers ferociously. And my new commander was my copilot!

I ordered both birds to cease firing, and we began flying “cold” passes over the LZ, between Charlie and the team. We did this several times, and I could see what appeared to be cigarette lighters flashing in the shadows on the ridge. I could also hear static on the radio, which we had learned was caused by the static field of many closely passing bullets. But we continued to hear explosions, with the FAC yelling for us to hold our fire. Damn it, we WERE holding our fire, and we were hanging ourselves out doing it. I spoke to Jim, and said we had better silence the ridge or it would silence us. He agreed, and despite the directives from the FAC, we shot the hell out of the ridge. But they were everywhere. As I cleared the LZ on one pass, below many of the trees, I fired a couple of rockets. One does not usually fire rockets so low, because there is no time to achieve stabilized flight, allowing one to aim. Therefore, they frequently zoom off into oblivion. But we had learned to “lob” rockets by pulling up on the collective just before firing. This would cause the rocket stabilizing fins to hit the air with an upward load, causing causing them to fly upward initially, then to arc downward because of the aerodynamic load on the fins.

My copilot appeared to be mesmerized by his first combat action, about as hectic as one could be. I called for him to flip the weapon selector switch from guns to rockets (they could not fire simultaneously, because the one trigger activated whichever weapon was selected for firing). He was frozen, so I had to take my eyes off the horizon for a millisecond and change the setting. This was hazardous because we were flying through the trees, dodging around the higher ones, trying to keep from being shot down. One minor mistake would be fatal for all. We tried to avoid passing over the same spot on succeeding passes, to keep Charlie from drawing a bead on us, but because of the ridgeline, we were forced to repeat ground tracks. We passed around one taller tree a couple of times, and I cursed the tree. On the following pass I fired a rocket to keep the bad guys’ heads down, and it knocked the tree down. Colonel Brotnov was flabbergasted, as was I. To this day I wonder if he really believes that I did that intentionally!

It turns out that the rockets into the team which were blamed on us were actually new shoulder-mounted Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG’S) being fired at us as we passed over the LZ between the team. The original RPG’s were designed for light armor and infantry, and had contact fuses. This new version was designed for helicopters, and had contact AND proximity fuses. Luckily, none must have passed close enough to us to detonate, but many passed by us, exploding among the team we were protecting. A few also exploded in the LZ, causing the tall elephant grass to catch fire. The flames were about as high as we were flying, and were spreading out in ever increasing circles. On one pass over the LZ, when I passed through the smoke, the other chopper was coming directly at us, only about 50-100 feet away, with closure speed of over 200 mph. Luckily we both broke quickly and in opposite directions, and the gunner said he thought he could reach out and touch the belly of the other chopper. Finally, the firing from Charlie cut down, and we called the slicks to come in for a pickup.

We said they would have to wait awhile because of the fires in the LZ. All of a sudden the team ran THROUGH these very high flames, leaping into the smoking ash left by the expanding fire. The slicks came in, one at a time, landed in the smoking ash, raising a huge, black ashen cloud, and picked up the team. We escorted them out of the area. Then, as the slicks headed for home, Jim and I returned to the site, expending the remainder of our rockets and ammo on the ridge line.

CPT Svoboda was an Air Force officer, a gunship pilot in the 20th Special Operations Squadron. The “slicks” were Sikorsky UH-34s, obsolete piston-powered helicopters flown by the South Vietnamese Air Force’s 219th Squadron, “King Bees.”

A gathering of SF RT guys and their air support guys is always interesting, because the aircrews think the recon teams were nuts to do what they did, but the RT guys know the copter crews were nuts to come get them.

Now, this is a very stirring story of action and audacity. You can almost smell the shellbursts of the RPGs. Thing is: RPGs don’t have proximity fuzes. (There is a Chinese “airburst” round for use against infantry, but it bounces off the ground before it detonates, and it postdates the war). So why did Captain Svoboda think they did? It goes back to a fundamental difference between the RPG-2, or B-40 as it was known to most during the Vietnam War (from the Chinese export stencil on the ammo), and the improved RPG-7. The RPG has become one of the most universal systems in war; there’s even a US-made, Westernized version we provide to allies under MAP.

But the initial mass-produced version, the Ruchnoi Protitankoviy Granatomyot-2 (“Hand AT Grenade Launcher”), was a reusable improvement of the German Panzerfaust and like its disposable ancestor, its designers’ watchword was simplicity. Indeed, US Army intelligence manuals on the Soviet Army at the time described it only as an “antitank weapon of the improved Panzerfaust type,” and lacked any photo or sketch of it.

It had no optical sights, just a flip-up pair with a front bead and rear ladder. It was a straight tube with sights and a grip piece, no shoulder rest, blast shield or cone. The RPG-2 was made in Russia from about 1948 to 1961, and in China from about 1956 to about 1970. And — important from our point of view — the warhead, which showed its later Panzerfaust ancestry, had a simple contact fuze and no self-destruct mechanism.

The RPG-7 was introduced to the Soviet Army in 1961 and into the Vietnam War sometime in 1967 or 68, although it remained outnumbered by RPG-2s until the last, 1975, offensive. It had iron and optical sights and considerably improved range (we’ve hit stationary tank-size targets on the range at 800m; practical combat range on moving armor is probably half that). Most interesting for our present purposes, the PG-7 warhead has not one, but three means of initiation:

  1. Piezoelectric contact fuze in the warhead nose (“1″ in the illustration);
  2. electric contact fuze between inner (“2″) and outer (“3″) cones of the warhead;
  3. pyrotechnic timed self-destruct mechanism (“8″).


All three fire the charge (“6″) from its base, creating a Munro Effect jet made up of hot gases and the molten copper alloy charge liner (“4″). The self-destruct mechanism detonates the round if it hasn’t hit anything in five seconds, by which time the round has covered 900-920m.

rpg7 training aid

That’s what was happening to CPT Charles Svovoda, his copilot LTC Harmon Brotnov, and his wingmen and the other US and RVN airmen on this mission. Airbursts of RPGs around them certainly seemed like the proximity fuzes they knew from enemy 37mm and 57mm anti-aircraft artillery.

It is possible that the airbursts’ threat to the rotorcraft was coincidental, but it is also possible that the NVA were deliberately using the self-destruct mechanism for its airburst effect; this is something Islamic terrorists would develop into a fine art in the nineties and the oughts, but it would certainly be consistent with what we know of the leadership and initiative of the North Vietnamese forces that they could have been doing this 20 years earlier, over Cambodia.

We can’t blame them for thinking they were facing “a new version, made for helicopters.” In any event, we concur with Fred Lindsey, who wraps up this post by quoting the citation for Svoboda’s Distinguished Flying Cross from this flight:

He was participating in aerial flight as a UH-1N helicopter Gunship Commander near Due Lap, RVN …CPT Svoboda made repeated firing passes at low level in support of a long range reconnaissance patrol which was under heavy opposing automatic weapons fire deep in hostile territory. The extremely accurate and devastating firepower from CPT Svoboda’s helicopter allowed the rescue of the entire patrol…

per Hqs 7th Air Force Orders dtd 09/24/71.

Captain Svoboda survived the war; along with the DFC, he received 10 Air Medals for combat missions in 1970 and 1971.

For more information on the RPG, look at this previous Weaponsman post, or this quite excellent history by Dan Shea in Small Arms Defense Journal. We cannot overstate the quality of the Shea article; it’s really good and accurate.

Haunting video of Japanese World War II Tanks

Some of them have been reclaimed by the jungle. Some, shattered by American fire. Some, parked in rows and left at war’s end. Some lie where salt water is reducing them to iron oxide day by day. Most of them have been looted, and some defaced by graffitti.

You may find the new-agey music with its Bolivian wind instruments and whatnot fitting, or you may like it. Personally, we’d have gone with something with traditional Japanese instruments, but then, we’re not making the video,it churlish to squawk about the decisions of the guy who actually made it.

The split, shattered armor of some of the tanks is mute testimony to the fate of the crews. Most Japanese families have a story of men who went to war, and whose fate is unknown, except that they did not return. Apart from a few prominent war criminals who faced the gallows at war’s end, the price of expansionist Japanese militarism was paid mostly by conscripted private soldiers on all sides.

Japanese tank technology was about where European tank tech was in the years running up to the war. The Japanese were engaged for a decade in China before taking the USA on, and their tanks, based on 1920s Vickers designs (which were world-leading at the time) and similar to English, Italian or Russian machines of the era, didn’t need much improvement to be effective against Chinese infantry and cavalry forces.

Most of them were only equivalent to the early-war US M3 Stuart light tank, if not outclassed by it. The best common Japanese tank, the Type 97 Chi-Ha, was outgunned and outarmored by the American M4 Sherman, a tank that was marginal in the ETO. It also didn’t help the warriors of Nippon that they had few anti-tank guns, and those were of inferior calibers. Lacking the evolutionary pressure of the tank battles of the ETO, Japanese tank development stagnated. Had the Home Islands been invaded, they’d have been helpless against Pershings.

They’d have rolled out anyway, fill of fight and Yamato damashii. It’s just as well that war was never fought. How many of those doomed tankers went on to have creative jobs and happy families in the postwar State of Japan?

The Japanese forces, scatttered across specks of islands in the vast Pacific, fought with immense bravery, but struggled always with logistics. The reason many of these tanks were captured intact is not that the Japanese ran out of fight, but because they ran out of fuel and/or ammunition.


On this Day in 1962: Infantry Nuke Test

The USA fired its last above-ground nuclear test at a test site in Nevada on this day, 17 July, in 1962. The operation was a culmination exercise that brought together nuclear warhead tests (code-named Little Feller, as a nod to the W54 warhead’s light weight and low yield) and nuclear weapons employment maneuvers code-named Ivy Flats.

Screenshot 2014-07-17 12.50.48

The test was a pretty-much full-spectrum test of an actual tactical nuke, and a very unusual one — a nuclear infantry weapon called the Davy Crockett. A lot of tripe is written about the Davy Crockett, including that it could not fire a projectile further than its blast radius, but most of that tripe is written by people who either apply unreasoning fear to all nuclear weapons (something that was encouraged during the Cold War by the Soviet Union and its witting and unwitting agents of influence), or by the sort of uninformed juicebox mafiosi that become “national security” writers for Wired. Even more-respected anti-nuclear campaigners often got it wrong, like some of the details on this basically solid page at the Brookings Institution. In fact, this test demonstrated that the weapon was safe, within its limits, and effective.

After many rehearsals, including a live-fire of an actual warhead suspended three feet above the ground (Test Little Feller II on 7 Jul 62), a Davy Crockett crew fired their weapon at a simulated enemy force 2,852 meters distant. They launched the projectile in front of trench-covered friendlies and — much further back — bleachers full of observers, including such VIPs as Robert F. Kennedy (then Attorney General) and Army Chief of Staff Max Taylor. (This test was Little Feller I, even though it was 10 days after Little Feller II). The weapon functioned flawlessly. Within half an hour, military units advanced through the blast zone. The entrenched troops were 1600m from the detonation; the Army calculated that the low-yield W54 would produce immediate casualties from radiation only within 250m, and delayed casualties only within 350m, of its impact point. These radiation effects were much more long-ranged than the heat and blast effects of the .02 kiloton warhead. A tank 100m from detonation would be usable, apart from the effects of radiation, which would have killed its crew.

Here’s a video of the test. We tried to find the original because this one has too much compression and a lot of video artifacts, but sometimes you have to take what you can get:

The actual burst is at about the half-way point, about nine minutes in. Other reports suggest that its yield was later calculated to be 0.018 kt, a little lighter than the 0.022 produced by the confusingly earlier Little Feller I test. As none of the surviving documentation suggests that this yield variation from the nominal 0,02 kt setting upset anyone at the time, it suggests that variance of plus or minus two-thousandths of a kiloton was considered nominal.

It’s interesting to see the other equipment the troops, from the 4th Infantry Division then at Ft. Lewis, Washington, have: Garand M1 rifles, M48 tanks, a Hiller UH-12 helicopter.

The Davy Crockett was actually an ingenious weapon, and for its time, an effective one, if only psychologically. How effective? Decades after it was retired, it was still taught to Soviet tank officers as a battlefield threat to be feared and targeted. When the weapon was withdrawn (due to further miniaturization allowing longer-range and more-accurate delivery of tactical nukes), the GRU managed to convince itself, and the Soviet General Staff, that the withdrawal was all a ruse by those perfidious Americans.

Here’s how it worked: the DC came in two versions, the M28 and M29. The “light” DC had a 2000 meter range, and the heavy 4000 meters. The caliber of the main recoilless gun was different: 120mm versus 155 mm, and even the caliber of the spotting gun, which was used to check trajectory before firing, differed: the “light” Davy Crockett has a 20mm recoilless spotting gun firing the M101 spotting round, and the “heavy” had a 37mm. Because the gun was recoilless, it and its tripod could be light. Both versions could be carried by Jeep or M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, and the M28 could be broken down into manpack loads (if heavy ones) and carried by its own crew.

davy crockett jeep

When XM101 spotting rounds were found in Hawaii, the media went haywire. Typical of the products of their “layers and layers of editors” was this graphic.

davy crockett

What’s wrong with it? Count the legs on the tripod.

The projectile, the M388, was roughly the size and shape of a prize watermelon, and could contain conventional explosives or a W54. It worked with both guns because it was a “supercaliber” projectile. (Imagine a watermelon-sized rifle grenade). A different piston was used in the smaller and larger guns. They also fire two non-nuclear (or simulated nuclear) Davy Crockett rounds.

A war in which battalion commander had their own nukes would have been… interesting. Army planners expected the US warhead stockpile to grow to over 150,000 warheads to support their Pentomic Division warfighting scheme. (That was about five times its actual 1967 peak).

The dummy version was of the M388 the M421. Almost all surviving documentation shows these weapons as non-type-classified, “XM” weapons (i.e. XM388, XM29, etc).


Authority to deploy the Davy Crockett was devolved almost as low as nuclear weapons commit authority ever got: the battalion commander had full authority to use the weapons as he saw fit, once a general release was granted.

Most Davy Crockett launchers were allocated only one or two warheads, plus several conventional high-explosive ones; this was because the system’s survivability on a tactical nuclear battlefield was somewhat constrained. It had to be fired within field-gun and mortar range of the targeted enemy (4,000m max), it was an unprotected weapons system, and it was

The launch produced a considerable backblast, and would have exposed the firers to enemy retaliation. This gave a small advantage to the light weapon, which was usually fired from its jeep. The heavy weapon had to be dismounted from a charmer personnel carrier or truck and fired from the tripod every time. Then, after exposing its position, it would have to be reloaded before the crew could skedaddle.

The Davy Crockett had a short service life; it was an interim weapon before warheads could be miniaturized into standard gun artillery weapons.

Because the M101 spotting rounds contained depleted uranium, which is now managed as a hazardous material, we’ve learned that 75,318 rounds of spotting M101 were produced. Some 2000 were expended in lot qualification tests at the factory, 44,000 were destroyed by firing into a containment after the weapon was scrapped, and a max of 29,000 were fired from the deployed launchers at a variety of field sites. Apart from the Ivy Flats/Little Feller I test on 17 Jul 62, no Davy Crockett was ever live fired. (There were warhead live tests earlier, during development).

Both versions of the Davy Crockett used the same projectile, the M388.

At the end of FY 62, the USA had 25,540 operational warheads in its stockpile, and growing. About 2,900 of them were Davy Crockett warheads. At the end of 2013, we had 4,804 total warheads, and shrinking. Among the entire classes of nukes that were eliminated were small-yield nukes like the Davy Crockett warhead, and battlefield nukes — like the Davy Crockett warhead.

Land Mines: The Political Class Risks Soldiers’ Lives to Feel Good

M15 AT MineThis report is from 27 June or so, so it’s a few days late, but still deserves comment. The sort of “human rights advocates” were always ready to impose an obligation on the civilized West, and always ready to make excuses for the barbarous East, have long been agitating for the elimination of land mines. You may remember it was a favorite cause of that well-born but empty-headed blonde twit, Princess Diana, the Paris Hilton of her day, famous for being famous, and well informed about nothing whatsoever.

It was also, back in the 1980s, a favorite cause célèbre for Soviet front groups. The reason is that NATO didn’t have a hope in hell of stopping the Third Shock Army without obstacles and mines. In military operations, obstacles and minds are only effective at their objective, usually to stop or to redirect or channelize an enemy force, if they’re covered by fire, or really, by observation and fire. Without observation and fire, mines are merely terrorist weapons. The common terrorist use of these weapons, and the reckless and irresponsible way they were used in the past by the Soviet-sponsored Afghan Army in Afghanistan, and by Third World armies of on all sides of the Cold War, have led people to blame the object rather than the human who employs it.

Gee, where have we seen that before?

The US, when the Government and the State Department or run by people who put American interests first, always resisted the banning of mines. So have other powerful nations that have to fight barbarous guerillas, including Russia and China. But the US is no longer run by people who put American interests first, and so we get this:

The United States will take steps to join a 15-year-old global treaty banning the use of antipersonnel landmines, the Obama administration said Friday.

The administration has previously said it was merely studying the Ottawa Convention, much to the dismay of human rights advocates for whom Washington’s unwillingness to sign the document has been a stain on the country’s record. While the U.S. still has yet to actually sign the treaty, Friday’s announcement signals a shift wherein the country will begin allowing its antipersonnel landmines to expire without then being replaced.

National Security Council Spokesperson Caitlin Hayden said in a statement Friday that the U.S. is “diligently pursuing solutions that would be compliant with and that would ultimately allow the United States to accede to the Ottawa Convention.”

The announcement came at the Third Review Conference of the Ottawa Convention in Maputo, Mozambique.

Ah, yes. In beautiful downtown Maputo, in a country whose government was formerly a terrorist group. A terrorist group did widely deployed mines against civilian populations; their favorite was a Soviet TM-46 AT mine deployed along bus routes. That’s definitely where you should go to seek your moral center.

Human rights groups welcomed the policy change with restrained optimism. “The new thing here is the intent to join the treaty,” Stephen Goose, executive director of the arms division at Human Rights Watch, told the New York Times.

The effort to ban the use of antipersonnel landmines has been a major goal of the disarmament movement. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines says about 10 people lose a limb or are killed by a landmine or other similarly-explosive “remnant of war” every day. Landmines litter parts of 60 countries around the world, the group says.

via U.S. Takes Steps Toward Signing Landmine Ban Treaty | TIME.

First, there’s no such thing as a “disarmament movement.” There’s a movement interested in disarming the United States and its allies. That movement exists, and always has. A movement that would address the barbaries of such groups as the former FRELIMO terrorists in Mozambique, though? Well, there’s no such thing.

Stephen Goose, he of the improbably comical name, is unlikely to ever say a word about FRELIMO or Hamas or Hezbollah, or any of the other groups that regularly use mines to sow chaos or random murder.

The professional armies of the world, in which we include the Russians and Chinese as well as the US and its allies, do not deploy mines randomly or haphazardly. Mines are laid according to plan, each one’s location is documented so that it can be removed; modern mines, moreover, are designed to self-inactivate after a period of time, so we don’t have the problem of unexploded ordnance slaying innocents two decades after a war has reached its resolution.

One reason small SF teams were able to run riot in enemy rear a’s areas in southeast Asia, is that when they were pursued they were able to lay mines on their back trail to delay pursuit. The most common of these were M14 toepoppers, and M18 Claymores rigged with a tripwire. Those types of mines were removed from us in the early 2000s. Right in the warzone, because the staff judge advocates, most of whom never faced a risk in their lives, wanted to make a “gesture” towards the arms controllers.

Sometimes, a Vietnam guy will see Lone Survivor and ask why they didn’t seed their backtrail with toe poppers or Claymores. They didn’t have them, that’s why: they were hijacked by the attorneys, so that the attorneys could sound enlightened to their fellow attorneys. If we lose a few guys, it’s not anybody the lawyers associate with, so they don’t care. (There are lawyers in the military who are not like this. They are few enough that any one of them can tell you the names of all the others).

But this latest “gesture” is just one more insult and injury against the insignificantly tiny minority of combat veterans and combat soldiers, by the growing class of Beltway parasites.

Gee, we now have warehouses (well, bunkers, actually) full of mines we’re not planning to use on our foreign enemies, not now, not ever. Can anyone think of a possible employment scheme for them?

The old V3-position of Hermes-Lampaden

V3 luxemborg

This appears to be of the Ardennes type but it may have been a test unit in Miedzyzdroje, Poland.

One of the most interesting weapons of World War II was the V-3, the little-known third Nazi “vengeance weapon.” It was an ultra-long-range cannon that used multiple breeches or powder-chambers, fired in order as a projectile shot down the barrel, right as it passed each chamber, to overcome the limits of standard artillery. It fired a subcaliber “arrow-shot” (Pfeilgeschuss) and was expected to hit London, accurately, from mainland France.

A site at Mimoyecques, France was the main location for the V-3. Over fifty tubes were planned for this weapon at this site, but the site was destroyed by bombardment by the RAF, using gigantic Tallboy bombs. As a result, the V-3, the “London Gun,” never fired a shot at England.

A German-language web page on the V-3 site at Hermes-Lampaden adds to our knowledge of this odd weapon’s history, because the Hermes-Lampaden V3s were fired in anger, at the allied-held city of Luxembourg. The website provides us with a launch pad to look at this weird weapon.

In 1942 engineer August Coenders, Chief Engineer of the Röchling firm, began to research the idea of the multi-chamber cannon, an idea in existence since the 19th Century. With the multi-chamber cannon principle, side-mounted propulsion-charge chambers were added to a cannon barrel, chambers whose propulsion charges were detonated after the projectile had passed them by, and which therefore brought higher velocities.

Coenders developed a multi-chamber cannon in 1942 under the cover name “High Pressure Pump. Soldiers nicknamed it, due to its unusual form for a cannon, “Tausendfüssler” meaning “Millipede,” or “Fleißiges Lieschen”, meaning, approximately, “Busy Lizzie.” The Nazis named it, in their taxonomy, V3, for the third operational “Vengeance Weapon.” The maker of the barrel sections for the piece was the firm Röchling Steel Works in Völklingen, Saarland, with finishing (final machining?) at Wetzlar.  The arrow-shaped, two meter long projectiles (150 mm caliber) which were designated “Rö Be 42″ were also developed by Röchling.

via V3-Stellung bei Hermeskeil-Lampaden.

Coenders developed versions of his very long, fin-stabilized sub-caliber shell for conventional artillery also — his big idea was to increase penetration by increasing sectional density, and it can be argued that his research led, after the war, to the common APFSDS (Armor Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot) round that tanks these days fire at enemy tanks.

The V-3 version of the Coenders round weighed 40 kilograms, of which 7-9 were explosive. It was 100mm with fixed tail fins and used front sabots and a rear sabot/obturator to fit in the HDP’s 150mm bore. The round left the muzzle at about 1050 meters/sec (3445 fps), almost instantly shedding its sabots, at least according to the drawings. Other sources suggest that the round barely broke 3,000 fps in combat applications).


The Mimoyecques installation was destroyed by the RAF’s legendary 617 Squadron in July, 1944, and then soon afterwards overrun. But as the site explains (in the German; translation is ours with notes [in brackets], or you can try the goog thing):

After the Allies captured the Channel coast near Mimoyecques in September 1944, the plan to bombard London with up to 50 HDPs from the bunkers had to be abandoned.  SS-Gruppenführer [~Colonel] [Hans] Kammler, to who the Vengeance Weapons detachments were subordinate, wanted to prove the combat suitability of the V3 beyond question, and sought from Hitler the permission to employ the HDP against the City of Luxembourg during the Ardennes Offensive [Battle of the Bulge].

To this end two shortened versions of the HDP with the designation LRK 15 F 58 (Langrohrkanone) [Long Barrel Cannon] were emplaced in Ruwertal near Hermeskeil-Lampaden. They were put into action by the Firts Battery of the Army Artillery Detachment 705. [This unit was an independent artillery unit that was under the command of the Kammler-controlled Vengeance Division (Division zur Vergeltung)]. The emplacement of the first gun took from 28 Nov 44 to 23 Dec 44, the second needed a little more time. Two steel guns were erected, which were positioned on a wooden substructure. The wooden substructure was half buried in the slope. The barrel elevation was 34°. This shortened version of the High Pressure Pump was no more than 50 m long and was fitted out with 12 side chambers attached at right angles. The cannons had a range of up to 60 km with a dispersion of up to 4 km.

That’s a pretty large group; an online angular size calculator tells us it’s 3.8 degrees, or 229 minutes of arc/angle. We suppose that if your target is, as was the norm for V-weapons, “minute of major metropolitan area,” that accuracy was acceptable.

The Mimoyecques guns had been meant to be 150m long and range 165km; the whole battery was supposed to be capable of firing 300 shells an hour on London. One gun intended for Mimoyecques provided some parts for both Hermeskeil-Lampaden guns, except that the Mimoyecques guns had the auxiliary chambers aligned in herringbone fashion, and the H-L guns had them set orthogonal to the gun’s bore.

The H-L guns, illustrated in this 26 Nov 44 drawing, were set at 34º and were made up of 13 straight sections and 12 cross-sections (where the chambers attached), and they hoped to deliver 3-4 shots per hour.

V3 plan

The V3 bombardment of Luxembourg was irritating and frightening, but of no military consequence. The pair of V-3s fired a total of 183 rounds, of which only 44 were confirmed as hits in the target area.  It’s uncertain whether it was the rounds on target, or the 139 that landed somewhere off target, that killed 10 people and wounded 25 — a pretty pathetic result. The guns were dismantled in February 1945 when the Germans withdrew from the area; the second gun was not taken out of action until the US Army was closing in. In 1945, parts of four HDPs were found at the Röchling plant, and removed to the USA for testing. They were subsequently scrapped.

Here are some links in English on the V3:

Learning the RPG-7

Obsolete (or at least obsolescent) in Russian service, the RPG-7 continues to serve with scores and scores of armies worldwide. Every Afghan armed force, regular or irregular, since about 1980, has used this versatile and powerful weapon.

This DOD B-roll video shows Marines training members of the Afghan National Army in the loading and firing of the RPG on 24 August 2011.  This was a train-the-trainer event; the Afghans in this video were being trained as small arms assistant instructors.

The Afghans are speaking Dari, not Pushtu. They’re firing with iron sights, not the optic (the optic takes days to train). Even the iron sights have two settings, normal and low-temperature [sub 0ºC]), and they’re using OG-7V HE/Frag warheads. This is that bad boy, in promotional makeup:


The rough midpoint of the rocket (that shiny band) is where it initiates. The firing pin of the RPG-7 is located on the ventral side of the weapon; the hammer strikes it in the “up” direction and it strikes an initiating primer. Since the primer is in only one position around the 360º circumference of the booster, the round is provided with a small lug (the “indexing lug”) that fits into a notch in the muzzle (the “indexing notch”). An RPG round that is not fully indexed and seated will not fire. The fins are contained inside the booster charge, This very nice 3D render of one of the RPG files available at “Turbo Squid,” a 3D file vendor, shows you how the fins work. It doesn’t include the safety pin and removable cap, both of which need to be taken off (as you can see in the B-roll of training video).


The firing sequence and performance of this round, in all but terminal effect, apes the more common PG-7 or PG-7V warhead, the twin-conical HEAT warhead. The booster charge (section III in the cutaway PG-7V image below) expels the OG-7 from the tube at 117 m/sec (384 fps) in a tenth of a second, by which time it has traveled 11 meters (~36 feet). The booster charge is routed through a de Laval nozzle or venturi that equalizes the pressure of the gases exiting the rear of the tube with the recoil from the grenade being expelled from the front — making, in an in-spec RPG, the recoil functionally zero. At the 11-meter point the rocket sustainer (II in the cutaway) fires and propels the warhead section, hitting a peak velocity of 294 m/sec (965 fps) until it hits the target, or if it finds no target or other object or surface, until 5 seconds have elapsed. At 5 seconds, the round is 900 meters (~2950 feet) from launch, and it self-destructs.

The round is stabilized by spring-out fins hinged inside Section III (the fins are shown stowed as 17). These fins are also beveled on one side of their leading edges to provide stabilizing spin in addition to the aerodynamic stability the fins supply. In addition, a small group of secondary fins (19) provides spin even during the in-tube boost.


Here is B-Roll of an interview with one of the Marines, Sgt. Christopher Samples.He explains what the training meant to achieve, and the roles of the gunner and a/gunner in an RPG crew. “It’s commonly used, but it’s commonly misused, as well. Once they learn how to effectively use it, it can be used against the enemy.”

In this interview, ammo tech Corporal Ryan McCarthy explains how the RPG works, according to his own understanding, and what he’s looking for: “Safety. Safety, safety, safety!”

And here is the finished, journalistic product, blending excerpts from the two interviews and the range fire on 24 August 11.

The RPG is a really, really outstanding weapon, and it fits in a sweet spot of direct-fire AT and AP support weaponry that’s really missing in the US infantry squad. Instead, we have more riflemen, and additional-duty weapons like the AT-4. The RPG is cheaper and reusable, and it has a range advantage over most US disposable non-guided weapons. Its effective anti-tank range is about double that of the AT-4, and the disposable AT-4 costs $1,500 a round.

History of the Weapon

The evolutionary history of the RPG is fascinating. The Soviets began by copying a weapon they’d felt the sharp end of: the German Panzerfaust. There were many versions of this disposable AT weapon available, and by war’s end the Germans were evolving this weapon in the direction of a reusable tube. It was the Panzerfaust that originated the grenade-launch boost and rocket sustainer operating system, and the weapon evolved rapidly under the pressures of mechanized warfare. Early Panzerfäuste had a mere 30 meter range, demanding bravery, or recklessness, from a rifleman under the pressure of hordes of T-34s or Shermans. And the warheads were marginal, at least on the well-protected T-34. By 1945 most of the initial weaknesses had been allayed by the intense development taking place behind the lines, and the industrial and R&D plant fell into Russian hands.

Unlike the USA, where captured German scientists and engineers came to be trusted, with many staying on as employees and seeking American citizenship, the Soviets, who suffered terribly at German hands, never trusted the Germans and held them in rigid captivity. As quickly as possible, they transitioned German projects, including rockets, guided AA missiles, and turbine engines as well as AT weapons, to Soviet design bureaux and shut the Germans out, generally releasing them back in the USSR’s occupied zone of Germany.

The Soviet engineers proved to be quick and imaginative. They continued to improve the Panzerfaust operating system. It is generally believed that a Soviet-produced version of the late-war Panzerfaust 250 was given limited issue as the Ручной Противотанковый Гранатомёт Ruchnoy Protitankovniy Granatomet or RPG-1. A Soviet-improved version was widely issued as the RPG-2 in the later 1940s, as part of the systematic re-equipment of the Soviet Army that also saw new rifles, machine guns, and soon, tanks in service.

The limits of the RPG-2 led to the larger, heavier, more solid, and tactically longer-ranged and more accurate RPG-7 in 1961, and the versatility of the RPG-7 has kept it on the world’s front lines to this day. While most of the world knows about the remarkable longevity of the Kalashnikov rifle, its AT counterpart is just as ubiquitous, and won’t be going away any time soon. (In fact, a US firm makes a modified version for Foreign Military Sales).

The RPG has come a long way from its origins as a copy of a last-ditch throwaway weapon of the Nazi empire. Indeed, it has outlived the other empire that bore it, and stands like a monument to good incremental/iterative design. Weapons themselves have no ideology; they’re just tools, and can be used for good or for ill. This one endures because the RPG-7 version is a superior design that fits a unique tactical niche.

Bubba the Mortarsmith

Take a look at this field-improvised 120mm mortar. Bubba is in Da House! With the Syrian rebels:

syrian_120mm_improvised_mortar(It does embiggen if you click on it).

The image is from a PBS Frontline segment, embedded below, which shows a Syrian rebel group that has purportedly received some US training and weapons (one of the weapons they received was a Russian 120mm mortar, which could let them retire the home-grown example above). The video shows them discussing, using, and complaining about the US-supplied, mostly Soviet-pattern, weapons. (They need and want anti-aircraft weapons).

According to the TV show, the mortar was made by welding up a carriage and improvising the barrel from a section of destroyed tank barrel. Because the Syrian Arab Army uses tanks with 100mm and 115mm guns, the gun had to be bored or reamed out to make a 120mm smoothbore mortar.

This thing looks about as safe as juggling chainsaws, but if you’re a Syrian rebel, you don’t have a lot of choices.

Report of the New Weapons Board, 1944

In 1944, the Army’s Ordnance branch (via the War Production Board) had mobilized the factories of industrial America to previously unimaginable levels of production, and arms flowed out of the factories and the warehouses in an iron river to the war fronts. Not just the American ones, either: vast quantities of armaments went to our British and Commonwealth allies, we fully armed the Free French, and Lend-Lease equipment was shuttled past the U-Boat threat to Russia via Murmansk, and end-run via Iran. While the Soviets also produced prodigial quantities of high-quality armaments themselves, they welcomed the Sherman tanks, White halftracks, Studebaker and GMC trucks and other hardware from America’s smokestack cities, and sent them into combat in the hands of young Russian and Soviet soldiers.

The US kept developing its weapons, but wanted to know: how good is our stuff, up at the sharp end? Since we couldn’t very well send officers to grill front-line Britons and Russians, we sent a commission to Europe to see how our troops were getting on with our ordnance equipment. The board stood up on 14 Jan 44, flew to North Africa, England, and Italy, and turned in their report on 27 April 44.

The mission of the board was to: 1. Disseminate among the theaters information concerning successful solutions to problems encountered in the theaters; 2. Obtain advice concerning the performance and suitability of standard weapons and equipment now in use in the theaters and assist in on-the-spot corrections of defects; 3. Introduce and demonstrate in the theaters new standard weapons and equipment which are available but are not in the theaters and new items which may be available within the following eight months, and to determine the requirements for the various items and; 4. Assist in increasing the effective use of weapons and equipment now in theaters.

The original report is available at the Combined Arms Research Digital Library (click the Download button, at eye level on the right; the downloaded file will be named 3351.pdf and will open automatically if your system allows it).

By and large, the Report shows an Army satisfied with its weapons. The section on small arms is brief; there was no controversy, and no suggested improvements, to the M1 rifle.

To date, all small-arms items have been in limited use in the North African theater and have been used only in training in the European theater. The extent to which small arms are being used is reflected by the ammunition expended. Based on a recent 30-day period, the following was the average expenditure per day per active weapon in the Fifth Army:

average_ammo_expenditure(note: we replaced the inline small-arms only numbers with ones from a more thorough appendix. In January, 1944, ).

Conversely, the M1 carbine got decidedly mixed reviews.

The opinion as to the worth of the carbine is divided. Many officers expressed a high regard for this weapon, whereas others look upon it more or less as a toy with insufficient striking power. The officers in this latter group would rather carry a rifle or a submachine gun, and a few prefer the pistol. It is believed that more information on the striking power and accuracy of this weapon should be supplied the theaters. The adjustable rear sight was immediately popular in both theaters, and a large demand for this item was established.

…The carbine is not popular with the infantry units in Italy. The main reason for this is that the personnel authorized the carbine are subject to fire chiefly from snipers, against which the carbine is ineffective. No solution or suggestions for a substitute were offered.

But one of Ordnance’s home-grown projects, the M1 Carbine bayonet, got thumbs down from the carbine’s foes and fans alike. Three different types of carbine bayonet were shown to troops in the North African and European theaters (the T4, T5 and T6 designs), and none were desired (Ordnance went on to make them anyway). There are several references to the desirability of a trench knife, and positive references to the new, short M1 rifle bayonet.

Little interest was shown in any type of bayonet for the carbine in either theater, although a request was made by the North African theater for the knife, T8, which is a combination trench knife and carbine bayonet. The new, short M1 bayonet for the rifle is preferred to the old, long bayonet. No breakage difficulty with this bayonet was reported. It should be remem- bered, however, that this bayonet has not seen extensive use in either theater, as there has been very little hand-to-hand combat.

Pistols are not a factor, except to note that some officers preferred them to carbines whilst others preferred rifles. Two new weapons, though, were a hit right off:

A real demand exists in both theaters for the M1919A6 machine gun. This weapon is entirely acceptable as a light machine gun until such time as a weapon meeting all the requirements of a light machine gun is available.


The simplicity, reliability, and ease of operation of this weapon [M3 .45 submachine gun]  were recognized immediately. A real demand was submitted by NATO; in the European theater this weapon is now arriving with troops. This submachine gun should be a real answer to the German Schmeiser [sic].

NATO in this case means the North Africa Theater of Operations, which requisitioned 7,300 of the M3 submachine guns. The ETO didn’t request them because M3s were already being pushed forward to those units, with no requisition necessary. The biggest problem with the 1919A6 was that previous promises hadn’t been kept, and the ordnance board was asked to expedite deliveries.

An inordinate amount of space is spent, by modern standards, on rifle grenades and gadgets for launching them. There’s also a discussion of the logistics of spare barrels and artillery tubes, and whether the burden can be reduced by using chrome plating to extend the heat rejection and durability characteristics of barrels.

The report also goes into heavy equipment. It has become conventional wisdom among historians that the M4 Sherman was badly outclassed by its German opposite numbers, so it’s surprising to see the glowing report about it:


The tanks of the M4 series are well liked by the using personnel, and they do not want a new tank unless it will offer very greatly improved military characteristics. There are, however, a number of components, such as tracks, suspension, and armament, that should be given immediate attention to improve combat efficiency. The using troops desire the following improvements in tank characteristics, listed in order of importance:

(1) Fire power.

(2) Mechanical reliability.

(3) Armor protection.

b. It should be noted that American troops are not particularly interested in thicker armor or in protected ammunition stowage, as it is generally felt that complete protection cannot be obtained and that the price to be paid for more protection would be undesirable from a standpoint of maneuverability.


And the newest version was even more enthusiastically awaited:

Tank, medium, M4E6.-This vehicle was accorded the most enthusiastic reception of any vehicle shown. General Eisenhower and General Devers both expressed a high regard for it and desired that it be supplied in quantity. This vehicle does not appear on the requisitions made from either theater, because plans for its supply were under way prior to the arrival of the Board and in ETO the exact number desired had not yet been determined and was awaiting General Eisenhower’s decision.

According to Green and Brown, M4 Sherman at War, p. 116-119, the M4E6 was the best of several ways of mounting a 76mm gun, with which the Ordnance experts promised Tiger kills at 2,000 yards. It used a completely new turret that was originally designed for a completely different prototype tank. The 76mm gun began to be used across the board in all Sherman variants (a different suffix A1, A2, etc. usually signifying a different engine). Within a few months of this report, the 76mm gun’s penetration would turn out to be seriously oversold.

The tank crews knew that the Germans had better tank guns:

ll the tank crews and armored battalion officers feel that the German tank guns are superior in all respects and particularly in their muzzle velocities. They believe that the 75-mm PAK 40 has more than double the muzzle velocity of our 75-mm gun, M3. There is an overwhelming request for increase in tank-gun muzzle velocities and for installa- tion of 76-mm guns in medium tanks of the M4 series.

One battalion engaged at Monte Cassino reported that most of its tank losses came from that PAK 40 gun, particularly in armored self-propelled versions. They also lost guns to 50mm PAK, Panzerschreck bazookas, and simple breakdowns, thrown tracks, and plain dumb getting stuck in places where enemy fire didn’t allow recovery.

This is what the board said about the troops’ desires vis-a-vis tanks:

Combat troops have definite ideas as to what improvements should be incorporated in tank design. First, the Board inquired as to what they considered the most important features in a tank. The replies were unanimous: the gun was of first consideration; second came dependability; third — whatever armor they could get after the first two requirements weremet; fourth — nothing was to be introduced in stowage or otherwise that would interfere in any way with carrying the maximum amount of ammunition.

With respect to the gun for the medium tank, they demand larger caliber and higher velocity. The T25 and T26 tanks with the 90-mm gun meet the requirement for more gun power, as does the M4 tank with the 76-mm gun. With respect to ammunition, they want nothing to interfere with ready rounds and they are willing to forego watered ammunition containers if this additional protection involves reducing the number of rounds of ammunition that can be carried.

The M4 tank is good and is well liked by everyone. However, the fact that the M4 is the outstanding tank of the war to date should not deter us from giving them a better one, especially when a tremendous improvement in battle efficiency may be attained.

There are also numerous specific And finally, there is a little bit of D-Day foreshadowing in “Weapons for Assault of Beaches.”

It was gratifying to note the progress that has been made in ETO in developing the use of weapons for landing operations. Although considerable progress has been made in the United States and in the theaters in providing fire power for landing operations, much remains to be done. The work done in the United States in developing floating tanks and gun motor carriages is outstanding. A few of these devices have been furnished ETO and arrived the day the Board left. The outstanding characteristic of these devices is that the guns may be used during the landing operation. The M4 tank gun with its stabilizer is one of the most accurate weapons for this purpose.

That is, of course, a reference to the famous Duplex Drive (DD) Sherman tanks of D-Day, many of which wound up on the bottom of the sea.

Full opportunity is being utilized to fire self-propelled and tank guns from landing craft. Rocket ships developed by the British and those of our Navy provide a lot of fire power on the beaches.

Those rockets would also be a D-Day flop, not because they didn’t work but because they fell into empty dunes between German fortifications and German reinforcements.

The addition of the self-propelled mounts recommended in this report will materially increase fire power in landing operations. This type of operation affords an outstand- ing use for all tanks and self-propelled mounts. Standard artillery is difficult to use and materially slows up unloading unless it can be fired from the traveling position. The Navy was contacted in Italy and England. It is wide awake to the situation and is making every effort to provide the required fire power. During landing operations naval and aerial bombardment of obstacles and offshore mine areas is essential. These types of bombardment will extend to landing areas on the beaches.

In light of all a German intelligence officer might have been able to deduce from this document, it’s hardly surprising that it was originally classified SECRET. Now it’s unclassified, and free for you to download.

(If you’re more interested in the tank firepower situation, and how the high confidence of January-April 1944 fared when the Shermans hit a peninsula full of Panthers and Tigers in June, here is a pretty well documented blog post on the subject. It turns out one reason the US overestimated its firepower is that the Germans used armor of greater hardness, face-hardened in addition; the US used homogeneous armor, and valued ductility more. The German armor may also have been of uneven quality).


I didn’t want the war!

Found in a remarkable Flickr on World War I German Artillery, here’s a Hun with a trio of British duds somewhere in an urban setting (judging from the brick wall and what appears to be a roller shutter behind him).

I didn't Want the War

The label on the large shell translates as: “I didn’t want the war — I’m staying neutral” and both of the little guys are saying, “Me neither!”

What is that under his right boot? It looks like it might be a sheet of paper. One wonders what is written on it!

The big shell is probably a 12 or 15-inch howitzer shell of the Royal Garrison Artillery, the branch of the Royal Artillery responsible for heavy, siege, or railway guns and howitzers. Here’s another picture of a German soldier mugging with a dud from the BL 15-Inch Howitzer. In the metric system this is a 381mm shell, and the BL 12-Inch Howitzer fires a 307mm round.


The Wikipedia caption suggests that the cylinder in front of this shell is “probably the rendered-safe fuze” of the shell, and that the image is from the photo album of Stefan Kühn, although whether Kühn is the trooper lying down with the shell, or the guy who now owns the picture, is unclear.

The 12 and 15 inch howitzers and their shells were conceptually similar and differed primarily in dimensions. The 15-inch weapon was a limited production one, and usually crewed by sailors or marines, but the 12-inch howitzer was produced in large quantities and was a mainstay of the Army. The next picture is a diagram of the 12-inch shell.


(All the pictures embiggen with a click, naturally).

Several things are apparent from this drawing:

  1. You really don’t want one of these dropping on you;
  2. They’re quite a high-tech device in their own way, for the period;
  3. The most interesting feature may be the waved ribs, apparently for retention/adhesion of the driving band. Yet the shells are often seen in period photographs without their driving bands.

Duds were a fact of Great War artillery life. There’s no consensus about how common they were, although the number of 30% crops up here and there. That seems intolerably high, until you remember that the manufacture of artillery shells was largely a governmental enterprise, and government seems to be content with a 70% score for, say, someone seeking a pilot’s license.

There’s an explanation for why they were so common, even if we can’t pin down exactly how common that was. The armies of Europe had a voracious appetite for shells in 1914-18, and with the manpower of the nations mobilized, women reinforced the labor pool in factories across the continent. New factories, war profiteering, due haste, and a more relaxed attitude towards safety than today’s EU would be likely to smile upon led to truly dismal quality control for the shells of all combatants. These kinds of dud photos are common, as are 100-year-old duds surfacing in the tines of farm tillers and the buckets of excavators today, and they represent one of the failure modes resulting from the weak QC of the age.

The other failure mode was also common, and resulted in the shell exploding all right, but on firing or immediately out of the muzzle. This was hard on the gun — whose burst barrel might add to the shrapnel — and the crew. There were few safety provisions on Great War ordnance, explosive charges, gaines and fuzes tended to contain highly volatile compounds like picric acid, and much of it was setback armed with no delay, something even manpower-rich Russia and China eliminated on safety grounds many decades ago.

Given the staggering quantities of ordnance fired, even if only one in a million rounds was a dud or a premature detonation, that implies staggering quantities of duds and destroyed gun positions. And much more than one in a million rounds were duds (although premature-dets were probably rarer than that, mercifully).

W. Edwards Deming would not be amused.